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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are inherently vulnerable to adver-
sarial inputs: such maliciously crafted samples trigger DNNs to
misbehave, leading to detrimental consequences forDNN-powered
systems. The fundamental challenges of mitigating adversarial in-
puts stem from their adaptive and variable nature. Existing solu-
tions attempt to improve DNN resilience against specific attacks;
yet, such static defenses can often be circumvented by adaptively
engineered inputs or by new attack variants.
Here, we present EagleEye, an attack-agnostic adversarial tam-
pering analysis engine for DNN-powered systems. Our design ex-
ploits the minimality principle underlying many attacks: to maxi-
mize the attack’s evasiveness, the adversary often seeks the min-
imum possible distortion to convert genuine inputs to adversar-
ial ones. We show that this practice entails the distinct distribu-
tional properties of adversarial inputs in the input space. By lever-
aging such properties in a principled manner, EagleEye effectively
discriminates adversarial inputs and even uncovers their correct
classification outputs. Through extensive empirical evaluation us-
ing a range of benchmark datasets and DNN models, we validate
EagleEye’s efficacy. We further investigate the adversary’s possi-
ble countermeasures, which implies a difficult dilemma for her:
to evade EagleEye’s detection, excessive distortion is necessary,
thereby significantly reducing the attack’s evasiveness regarding
other detection mechanisms.
KEYWORDS
Machine learning system; Adversarial input; Attack-agnostic de-
fense
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the abrupt advances in deep learning
(DL) techniques [24], which lead to breakthroughs in a number
of long-standing artificial intelligence tasks (e.g., image classifica-
tion, speech recognition, and even playing Go [37]). Internet giants,
such as Google, Facebook and Amazon, all have heavily invested
in offering DL-powered services and products.
However, designed to model highly nonlinear, nonconvex func-
tions, deep neural networks (DNNs) are inherently vulnerable to
adversarial inputs, which are malicious samples crafted by adver-
saries to trigger DNNs to misbehave [42]. Figure 1 shows an exam-
ple: both original images are correctly recognized by a DNN; with
a few pixels altered, the resulting adversarial images are misclassi-
fied by the same DNN, though the difference is barely discernible
for human eyes. With the increasing use of DL-powered systems in
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: (a) (c) genuine inputs - both are correctly recog-
nized; (b) (d) adversarial inputs - (b) is misclassified as “70
mph” and (d) is misclassified as “30 mph”.
security-critical domains, adversaries have strong incentive to ma-
nipulate such systems via forcingmisclassification of inputs: illegal
content can bypass content filters that employ DL to discriminate
inappropriate web content [17]; biometric authentications that ap-
ply DL to validate human faces can be manipulated to allow im-
proper access [39]; in the near future, driverless vehicles that use
DL to detect traffic signs may be misled to crashing.
The fundamental challenges of defending against adversarial
input attacks stem from their adaptive and variable nature: they
are created tailored to target DNNs, while crafting strategies vary
greatly with concrete attacks. Existing solutions attempt to im-
prove DNN resilience against specific attacks [14, 18, 21, 34, 38];
yet, such static defenses, once deployed, can often be circumvented
by adaptively engineered inputs or by new attack variants. For in-
stance, the training data augmentation mechanism [14, 32] sug-
gests to train DNNs on adversarial inputs; as detailed in § 3, the
resulting models often overfit to known attacks, thus being even
more vulnerable to unseen variants. Further, most existing solu-
tions require significant modifications to either DNN architectures
or training procedures, which often negatively impact the classifi-
cation accuracy of DNN models. Indeed, recent theoretical explo-
ration [11] has confirmed the inherent trade-off between DNN ro-
bustness and expressivity, which significantly impedes the adop-
tion of existing defense solutions in accuracy-sensitive domains.
In this paper, we take a completely new route: instead of striv-
ing to improve DNN robustness against specific attacks, we aim
at defense mechanisms that make minimal assumptions regarding
the attacks and adapt readily to their variable nature. To this end,
we design, implement and evaluate EagleEye, an attack-agnostic
adversarial tampering analysis engine for DL-powered systems.
At a high level, EagleEye leverages the minimality principle un-
derlying many attacks: intuitively, to maximize the attack’s eva-
siveness, the adversary often seeks the minimum possible distor-
tion to convert a genuine input to an adversarial one. We show
both empirically and analytically that this practice entails the dis-
tinct properties shared by adversarial inputs: compared with their
genuine counterparts, adversarial inputs tend to distribute “closer”
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Figure 2: Illustration of DNN models.
to the classification boundaries induced by DNNs in the input man-
ifold space. By exploiting such properties in a principled manner,
EagleEye effectively discriminates adversarial inputs and even un-
covers their correct classification outputs. We also investigate the
adversary’s possible countermeasures by abandoning the minimal-
ity principle, which however implies a difficult dilemma for her:
to evade EagleEye’s detection, excessive distortion is necessary,
thereby significantly reducing the attack’s evasiveness with respect
to other detection mechanisms (e.g., human vision).
Note that we are not arguing to replace existing defense solu-
tions with EagleEye. Rather, their distinct designs entail their com-
plementary nature. EagleEye exerts minimal interference to exist-
ing components of DL-powered systems and is thus compatible
with existing defenses. Moreover, the synergistic integration of Ea-
gleEye with other mechanisms (e.g., defensive distillation [34]) de-
livers even stronger defenses for DNNs.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We expose the limitations of existing defenses against ad-
versarial input attacks, which motivates the design of Ea-
gleEye. To our best knowledge, our empirical evaluation
(§ 3) is the most comprehensive study to date on varied
attack and defense models.
• We identify the minimality principle underlying most at-
tacks, which entails the distinct properties shared by ad-
versarial inputs.We design and implement EagleEye, which
effectively exploits such properties in a principled manner
(§ 4).
• We analytically and empirically validate EagleEye’s effi-
cacy (§ 5 and § 6), which achieves promising accuracy in
discriminating adversarial inputs and even uncovering their
correct classification outputs.
• We investigate the adversary’s possible countermeasures
and their implications. We also empirically explore the
synergistic integration of EagleEye with existing defense
mechanisms (§ 6 and § 7).
All the source code of this paper will be released onGitHub after
the double-blind review is complete.
2 ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
In this section, we introduce a set of fundamental concepts and
assumptions, and survey representative attack and defense models
in literature.
2.1 Deep Learning
DL represents a class of machine learning algorithms designed to
learn high-level abstraction of complex data using multiple pro-
cessing layers and nonlinear transformations. Figure 2 shows a
typical DNN architecture.
In this paper, we primarily focus on image classification tasks,
while our discussion generalizes to other settings (see § 7). In these
tasks, the DNN encodes a mapping f : X → O, which assigns a
given image x (represented as a vector) in the input space X to
one of a set of classes O. For example, with the Mnist dataset as
inputs, f classifies each image as one of ten digits ‘0’-‘9’. As shown
in Figure 2, the last layer of f often employs a softmax function.
Specifically, let
®z , [z1, z2, . . .] σ = exp(z)∑
i exp(zi )
, [σ1,σ2, . . .]
respectively be the input and output of this layer. Then σi is the
probability that x belongs to the ith class. The predicted class of x
is given by f (x) = argmaxi σi .
We consider DNNs obtained via supervised learning. Specifi-
cally, to train a DNN f , the algorithm takes a training set, of which
each instance (x, o) ∈ X × O constitutes an input and its ground-
truth class, and determines the parameter setting of f via mini-
mizing a loss function ℓ(f (x), o) (e.g., the cross entropy of ground-
truth classes and f ’s outputs).
2.2 Attack Methodologies
Targeting a DNN f deployed in use, the adversary attempts to
trigger f to misbehave by feeding it with carefully crafted inputs.
Given a genuine input x correctly classified by f , the adversary
generates an adversarial one xϵ by perturbing x with an insignif-
icant amplitude (e.g., a few pixels). The difference of x and xϵ
(r = xϵ − x) is referred to as the perturbation vector (PV).
We differentiate two attack scenarios. In an untargeted attack,
the adversary is interested in simply forcing f to misclassify, i.e.,
f (xϵ ) , f (x). In a targeted attack, she further desires for a particu-
lar target output oϵ , i.e., f (xϵ ) = oϵ . In the following we focus our
discussion on targeted attacks, while the extension to untargeted
attacks is straightforward.
A variety of attack models have been proposed in literature [8,
14, 21, 33]. Despite their variations in concrete crafting strategies,
they all roughly follow a two-step procedure: (i) saliency estima-
tion: the adversary assesses the impact of changing each input com-
ponent on the classification output; (ii) perturbation selection: the
adversary uses the input saliency information to select and perturb
a subset of input components. Based on the concrete implemen-
tation of the two steps, we classify existing attacks in two major
categories.
2.2.1 Linear Craing Aacks. The class of linear attacks esti-
mate the impact of distorting different input components on f ’s
output via linear approximations and find the PV r that maximizes
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the probability of the target output oϵ . Next we detail two repre-
sentative attack models.
Goodfellow’s Attack. Goodfellow et al. [14] proposed the first
linear attack model, which computes the gradient of the loss func-
tion ℓ with respect to the input x and determines r as a gradient
sign step in the direction that increases the probability of the target
output oϵ .
Specifically, let sign(▽x ℓ(f (x), oϵ )) be the gradient sign of ℓwith
respectx for given oϵ . Then the PV is defined as: r = −δ ·sign(▽x ℓ(f (x), oϵ )),
where δ is a parameter controlling the distortion amplitude (i.e., l∞-
norm of r ). Often, the adversary seeks the minimum δ to achieve
misclassification: minδ f (x + r ) = oϵ .
Huang’s Attack. Huang et al. [21] introduced another linear at-
tack model, which is constructed upon a linear approximation of
the output of the softmax layer, i.e., the last layer of a DNN model
(see Figure 2).
Let σϵ be the softmax output of xϵ = x + r . This attack approx-
imates σϵ using a linear form: σϵ ≈ σ + Jr , where J = dσdx is the
Jacobian matrix. Assume the original output o and target output
oϵ respectively correspond to the jth and jthϵ row of J , denoted by
Jj and Jjϵ . Let ∆ J , Jjϵ − Jj . To trigger f (xϵ ) = oϵ , the adversary
seeks r that maximizes the difference of the jthϵ and j
th component
of σϵ , i.e., maxr ∆ J · r .
Similar to [14], this attack determines r as a step in the sign
direction of ∆ J , i.e., r = δ ·sign(∆ J ), where δ controls the distortion
amplitude1.
2.2.2 Nonlinear Craing Aacks. In linear attacks, the PVs are
found in a single attempt. In comparison, nonlinear attacks con-
struct the PVs iteratively. At each round, the adversary estimates
the impact of each input component on the classification output,
then selects several components to perturb, and checks whether
the updated input causes the target misclassification. Next we de-
tail two representative nonlinear attacks.
Papernot’s Attack. Papernot et al. [33] proposed a saliency map
to guide the crafting process. Intuitively, this map describes the
impact of each input component on the output. Given the current
input x (with previously selected components perturbed) and tar-
get output oϵ (corresponding to the jthϵ component of σ ), the i
th
component is associated with a pair of measures:
αi =
∂σjϵ
∂xi
βi =
∑
j,jϵ
∂σj
∂xi
where αi is its impact on the probability ofoϵ , while βi is its impact
on all the other classes.
The attack consists of multiple iterations of a greedy procedure.
At each round, two components with the largest value of (−α · β)
are selected and flipped (to either ‘1’ or ‘−1’), and the saliency map
is updated accordingly. This process continues until the resulting
input is misclassified as oϵ . The distortion amplitude is defined by
the number of distorted components, i.e., l1-norm of r .
1In [21] Huang et al. also give the definition of optimal r when the distortion ampli-
tude is measured by l1- or l2-norm of r .
Carlini’sAttack. In response to the defensive distillationmethod [34],
Carlini and Wagner introduced a nonlinear attack [8], which dif-
fers from [33] in two aspects:
• To compensate for the gradient vanishing due to defensive
distillation, the input to the softmax layer is artificially am-
plified by τ times, where τ is the “temperature” used by
defensive distillation. The output of the softmax layer is
thus: σ = exp( zτ )/
∑
j exp( zjτ ).
• The saliency values of input components are defined as
|α − β | rather than (−α · β). This modification reduces the
complexity of perturbation selection from O(n2) to O(n),
where n is the number of input components. At each itera-
tion, a pair of input components with the largest saliency
values are selected and flipped.
2.2.3 Linear vs. Nonlinear Aacks. Linear attacks require com-
puting gradient or Jacobian only once, while nonlinear attacks of-
ten involve multiple rounds of gradient or Jacobian computation.
Given their efficiency advantage, linear attacks can be exploited to
craft a large number of adversarial inputs.
Meanwhile, existing linear attacks often measure the distortion
amplitude by l∞-norm of the PV, while existing nonlinear attacks
attempt to minimize l1-norm or l2-norm of the PV.
The empirical comparison of the characteristics of different at-
tacks is detailed in § 3.
2.3 Defense Methodologies
A DNN’s resilience against adversarial inputs is inherently related
to its stability [5]. Intuitively, a DNN f is stable, if for any “proxi-
mate” inputs x and xϵ (i.e., | |xϵ − x | | is small), f (x) and f (xϵ ) are
similar. Motivated by this rationale, a plethora of solutions [14, 18,
21, 34, 38] have been proposed to improve DNN stability, which
can be roughly classified in three major categories.
Data Augmentation. This class of methods improve DNN sta-
bility by proactively generating a set of adversarial inputs and in-
corporating them in the training process. Formally, given a DNN
f and a known attack д, via applying д over f , one generates an
adversarial input xϵ for each genuine instance (x, o). A new DNN
f ′ is trained using an augmented objective function:
min
f
∑
(x,xϵ ,o)
(α · ℓ(f (x), o) + (1 − α) · ℓ(f (xϵ ),o))
where the parameter α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) balances the relative weight of
genuine and adversarial inputs. For instance, Goodfellow et al. [14]
suggested equal importance of genuine and adversarial inputs (λ =
0.5),
Nevertheless, these methods are inherently heuristic, without
theoretical guarantee on the robustness or accuracy of the trained
DNN models.
Robust Optimization. Another line ofwork proposed to improve
DNN stability via directly altering its objective function. To be spe-
cific, one prepares a DNN f for the worst possible inputs by train-
ing it with an minimax objective function:
min
f
max
| |r | |≤δ
ℓ(f (x + r ),o) (1)
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The training algorithm first searches for the “worst” PV (con-
strained by δ ) that maximizes the loss function ℓ under the current
setting of f ; it then optimizes f with respect to this PV. This objec-
tive function essentially captures the misclassification error under
adversarial perturbations.
Due to the complexity of DNNmodels, it is intractable to search
for exact worst adversarial inputs. Certain simplifications are of-
ten made. Szegedy et al. [42] and Gu and Rigazio [18] proposed to
search for r along the gradient direction of loss function, while Sha-
ham et al. [38] and Miyato et al. [28] reformulated this framework
for Kullback-Leibler divergence like loss functions.
Model Transfer. In this method, one transfers the knowledge of
a teacher DNN f to a student DNN f ′ such that the model stability
is improved.
For instance, Papernot et al. [34] proposed to employ distilla-
tion [2, 19], a technique previously used to transfer the knowledge
of an ensemble model into a single model, to improve DNN stabil-
ity. Specifically,
• The teacher DNN f is trained on genuine inputs; in partic-
ular, the input to the softmax layer (see Figure 2) is modi-
fied as z/τ for given “temperature” τ (τ > 1).
• One evaluates f on the training set and produces a new
training set {(x,σ )}, where σ encodes the predicted prob-
ability distribution (“soft label”) of x .
• By training the student DNN f ′ on the new training set
under temperature τ , f ′ is expected to generalize better to
adversarial inputs than f .
Additionally, there is recent work attempting to design newDNN
architectures [18] or learning procedures [9] to improve DNN sta-
bility. Yet, the resulting models fail to achieve satisfying accuracy
on genuine inputs. Due to space limitations, we focus our discus-
sion on the above three classes of defense mechanisms.
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY
Next we empirically evaluate the effectiveness of existing defense
solutions against varied attacks. To our best knowledge, this evalu-
ation represents the most comprehensive study to date on a range
of attack and defense models, and is thus interesting in its own
right.
In a nutshell, we show that it is fundamentally challenging to de-
fend against adversarial inputs, which are tailored to target DNNs
and craftedwith varying strategies. Unfortunately, existing defenses
are inherently static. Although they improve DNN resilience against
specific attacks, the resulting models, once trained and deployed,
are unable to adapt to a priori unknown attacks. The adversary can
thus circumvent such defenses by creating inputs exploiting new
vulnerability of target DNNs.
3.1 Setting of Study
Datasets andDNNModels. To show the prevalence of attack vul-
nerabilities across different tasks, in our study, we use three bench-
mark datasets, Mnist [25], Cifar10 [22], and Svhn [30], which
have been widely used to evaluate image classification algorithms.
The details of datasets can be found in Appendix A.
We also consider three distinct DNN architectures and apply
each to one of the datasets above. To be specific, we apply the con-
volutional neural network (Cnn) [23], maxout network (Mxn) [26],
and network-in-network (Nin) [26]models to classifying theMnist,
Cifar10, and Svhn datasets, respectively. The implementation de-
tails of these DNN models are referred to Appendix B.
Attacks andDefenses. We implement all the attackmodels in § 2.2,
which we refer to as G-, H-, P-, and C-Attack for brevity. In par-
ticular, following [14, 21], we set the limit of distortion amplitude
for G- and H-Attack as 0.25 (i.e., δ ≤ 0.25 in § 2.2); for P- and
C-Attack, as in [34], we fix this limit to be 112, i.e., the adversary
is allowed to perturb no more than 112 pixels.
We implement one representative solution from each defense
category in § 2.3. In particular, as data augmentation is attack-specific,
we refer to the resultingmodels as G-, H-, P-, and C-trained DNN;
as robust optimization is norm-specific, we train robust DNNs un-
der both l∞- and l1-norm criteria. The implementation details of
defense methods are referred to Appendix C.
3.2 “No Free Lunch”
Table 1 summarizes the classification accuracy of the original DNN
models (Cnn, Mxn, Nin) trained over legitimate inputs and their
defense-enhanced variants on the benchmark datasets (Mnist, Ci-
far10, Svhn).
Observe that the original models achieve accuracy (i.e., 99.5%,
85.2%, 95.2%) close to the state of the art [6]. In comparison, most of
their defense-enhanced variants observe non-trivial accuracy drop.
For example, the accuracy decreases by 4.7% from the originalMxn
model to its defensive distilled variant (model transfer), while this
drop is as significant as 20.8% in the case of the G-trained variant
(data augmentation).
We thus conclude that the improvement of attack resilience is
not “free lunch”, often at the expense of classification accuracy.
This observation is consistent with the theoretical investigation
on the trade-off between DNN expressivity and robustness [11].
3.3 “No Silver Bullet”
Next we evaluate different DNNs’ attack resilience. Under the limit
of distortion amplitude, we measure the percentage of legitimate
inputs in each testing set which can be converted to adversarial
inputs by varied attacks. Table 2 summarizes the results. The most
successful attack under each setting is highlighted.
For the original models, most attacks, especially P- and C-
Attack, achieve near-perfect success rates, implying the prevalence
of vulnerabilities across DNN models.
The data augmentation method significantly improves DNN re-
silience against linear attacks. The success rate of G-Attack drops
below 6% when facing G-trained Cnn. However, it is much less
effective for more complicated DNNs or against nonlinear attacks.
Both P- and C-Attack achieve near-perfect success rates against
data augmentedMxn and Nin. This is because data augmentation
is only capable of capturing simple, linear perturbations, while the
space of PVs for nonlinear attacks and complex DNN models is
much larger.
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Data Original Model
Defense-Enhanced Models
Data Augmentation (α = 0.5) Robust Optimization Model Transfer
G-trained H-trained P-trained C-trained l1-norm l∞-norm (τ = 40)
Mnist 99.5% 98.8% 99.0% 99.0% 98.8% 98.1% 98.5% 98.9%
Cifar10 85.2% 64.4% 57.6% 75.9% 76.7% 72.1% 71.3% 80.5%
Svhn 95.2% 91.3% 85.0% 91.2% 92.4% 90.2% 81.5% 86.0%
Table 1: Classification accuracy of original and defense-enhanced DNN models with respect to benchmark datasets.
Data Attack Original Model
Defense-Enhanced Models
Data Augmentation (α = 0.5) Robust Optimization Model Transfer
G-trained H-trained P-trained C-trained l1-norm l∞-norm (τ = 40)
M
n
is
t
G- 15.3% 5.9% 82.4% 40.0% 70.6% 21.2% 0.0% 1.18%
H- 22.4% 7.1% 87.1% 84.7% 91.8% 22.4% 0.0% 1.18%
P- 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1.0%
C- 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
C
if
a
r
1
0 G- 96.5% 100.0% 100.0% 93.3% 100.0% 98.1% 79.7% 39.8%
H- 91.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.8% 98.1% 71.2% 38.6%
P- 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 94.3% 100.0% 21.7%
C- 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 64.2% 98.31% 100.0%
S
v
h
n
G- 99.5% 36.9% 4.39% 99.5% 99.5% 100.0% 0.0% 7.5%
H- 94.6% 35.4% 5.37% 93.4% 94.9% 96.7% 0.0% 7.5%
P- 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.7% 3.0%
C- 100.0% 98.0% 98.1% 100.0% 99.5% 95.6% 90.8% 100.0%
Table 2: Resilience of original and defense-enhanced DNN models against adversarial input attacks.
By considering worst-case inputs at every step of training, the
robust optimizationmethod leads to stronger resilience against lin-
ear attacks. For example, in the cases of Mnist and Svhn, the en-
hanced DNN models completely block G- and H-Attack. How-
ever, similar to data augmentation, robust optimization is ineffec-
tive against nonlinear attacks. This is partially explained by that
the adversarial perturbations considered in training are essentially
still linear (see Eq.(2)).
Model transfer is the only defense effective against nonlinear
attacks. The success rate of P-Attack drops to 1% against defensive
distilledCnn, which is consistent with the results in [34]. However,
this effectiveness is not universal. C-Attack, which is engineered
to negate the gradient vanishing effects, is able to penetrate the
protection of defensive distillation completely.
From the study above, we conclude that none of the existing
defense solutions is a “silver bullet”. While they improve DNN re-
silience against specific attacks, the resulting models are unable to
adapt to new attack variants. There is thus an imperative need for
attack-agnostic defense mechanisms.
4 DEFENDING DNNWITH EAGLEEYE
Next we present EagleEye, an attack-agnostic adversarial tamper-
ing analysis engine. Its design is motivated by a set of desiderata,
which we believe are expected for practical and effective defense
mechanisms.
• Attack-agnostic defense. It should be universally effective
against known and a priori unseen attacks.
Target DNN
1 "70 mph"?
Classification Result
Input 4
!x
(i) Integrity Checking
What is its correct class?
(ii) Truth Recovery
Has    been tampered?!x
 Tampering Analysis Result
2
3
Adversarial Tampering
Analysis Engine
(EagleEye)
Figure 3: Use case of EagleEye.
• Intact DNN models. It should require no modification to
DNNmodels, as such changes, especially to DNN architec-
tures or training procedures, often result in unpredictable
system behaviors.
• Light-weight execution. It should incur negligible perfor-
mance overhead to the DL-powered system.
EagleEye satisfies all these desiderata. In its overview (§ 4.1), we
show that EagleEye, following a modular design, requires no mod-
ification to DNN models or training methods; in its detailed de-
scription (§ 4.2), we demonstrate that EagleEye provides universal
defense by making minimal assumptions regarding incoming at-
tacks; in § 6, we further validate that EagleEye meets the require-
ment of light-weight execution by evaluating its empirical perfor-
mance within DL-powered systems.
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4.1 Overview
In contrast of existing solutions, EagleEye takes a completely new
route: it attempts to discriminate adversarial inputs; moreover, for
suspicious cases, it is instrumented to infer their correct classifica-
tion outputs. Therefore, EagleEye provides much richer diagnosis
information than existing defense solutions.
Specifically, as depicted in Figure 3, EagleEye is deployed as an
auxiliary module within a DL-powered system. It exerts minimal
interference with the classification task (1). Rather, for the given
input x (2) and DNN (3), it offers on-demand adversarial tamper-
ing analysis: (i) it first runs integrity checking to assess the pos-
sibility that x has been maliciously tampered; (ii) if suspicious, it
further performs truth recovery to infer x’s correct classification.
The analysis result is combined with the DNN’s classification to
form a comprehensive report for the operator’s decision-making
(4). Clearly the design of EagleEye satisfies the desiderata of intact
DNN models. Next we focus on realizing attack-agnostic defense.
4.2 Minimality Principle
Despite their apparent variations, different attacks follow similar
design principles, which entail invariant properties shared by ad-
versarial inputs, independent of concrete attacks. In specific, we
exploit the minimality principle underlying most attack models as
the foundations for building attack-agnostic defenses.
Intuitively, to maximize the attack’s evasiveness, the adversary
often seeks the minimum possible distortion to convert genuine
inputs to adversarial ones. Formally,
Definition 4.1 (Minimality Principle). Given the target DNN f ,
genuine input x , and adversarial output oϵ , the attack seeks to
solve an optimization problem as:
min
r
| |r | | s.t. f (x + r ) = oϵ
For example, [14, 21] instantiate this problem with | | · | | defined
as l∞-norm, while [8, 33] consider l1-norm.
To understand the entailments of this principle, we first intro-
duce several key concepts (see Figure 4).
Definition 4.2 (Boundary). A DNN f partitions the input space
(the topological space spanned by all the inputs) into non-overlapping
regions. The inputs in each region are classified by f into the same
class. Adjacent regions are separated by their boundary.
Definition 4.3 (Path). For given inputs x , xϵ with xϵ = x + r , the
PV r encodes a path from x to xϵ , of which the length is defined as
the magnitude of r , | |r | |.
Definition 4.4 (Radius). The path length of an input x to its near-
est neighbor xϵ in another class oϵ is referred to as x’s radius to
class oϵ , denoted by ρ(x, oϵ ).
We now translate the minimality principle in the language of
boundary, path, and radius: given a genuine input x , among all the
possible (adversarial) inputs in the target class oϵ , the adversary
seeks xϵ with the shortest path length from x . Therefore, the min-
imality principle entails the following important properties:
• Property 1: the path length of x to xϵ approximates x’s
radius to oϵ , ρ(x, oϵ ).
!x !xǫ
Region o Region oǫBoundary
Legitimate Input Adversarial Input Path
Radius ρ("x, oǫ)
Figure 4: Concepts of boundary, path, and radius.
• Property 2: xϵ tends to distribute extremely close to the
boundary of o and oϵ .
Next we empirically verify these properties, while their analyt-
ical treatment is deferred to § 5.
Specifically, given a genuine input x (in class o) and an adver-
sarial one xϵ (in class oϵ ) generated by an attack A, in the given
dataset, we find x’s closest genuine counterpart x∗ in class oϵ , i.e.,
| |x − x∗ | | is minimized. We then compute the ratio of x’s distance
to xϵ and xϵ : | |x − xϵ | |/| |x − x∗ | |.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution of such ratios with
respect to P- and C-Attack on the Cifar10 dataset (similar results
observed on other datasets and attacks). Observe that most ratios
lie in the interval of [0, 0.01], regardless of attacks, suggesting that
x resides much closer to its nearest adversarial neighbor in oϵ than
to its genuine counterpart. Thus | |x −xϵ | | approximates x’s radius
to oϵ .
Further, by applyingA to the adversarial input xϵ , we generate
another adversarial one2 xϵ 2 in classo; similarly, | |xϵ−xϵ 2 | | approx-
imates xϵ ’s radius to o, ρ(xϵ ,o). We then compute the quantity of
| |xϵ − xϵ 2 | |/| |x − xϵ | |, i.e., a proxy for ρ(xϵ , o)/ρ(x, oϵ ).
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution of such ratios. Across
both attacks, over 80% of the ratios concentrate in the interval of
[0, 0.2], indicating xϵ distributes closer to the boundary than its
genuine counterpart x .
4.3 Building EagleEye
These properties provide the premise for building effective differ-
entiators to identify adversarial inputs: for a given input x (clas-
sified by f as o), we measure its radii to all other classes, among
which we find the minimum one: minoϵ,o ρ(x, oϵ ), referred to as
its adversarial radius (AR).3 With Property 1 and 2, we can differ-
entiate genuine and adversarial inputs via examining their ARs.
However, to realize this idea, we face twomajor challenges. First,
the radiusmetrics are attack-specific, e.g., it is measured differently
by G- and P-Attack. Directly measuring radii is at most effective
for specific attacks. Second, even for known attacks, finding an
2Strictly speaking, xϵ2 is adversarial, given that it is created by perturbing another
adversarial input xϵ . Here we broadly refer to all the artificially generated inputs as
adversarial inputs.
3Similar definitions have also been discussed in [5, 11, 12].
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of the ratio of input ®x ’s
shortest distance to adversarial and genuine inputs (on the
Svhn dataset).
optimal threshold is difficult; even if it exists, it tends to vary with
concrete datasets and DNN models.
To tackle the first challenge, we propose adversarial radius prob-
ing (ARP), an attack-neutral method to indirectly approximate AR.
In specific, it employs semi-random perturbations andmeasures an
input x’s AR as the minimum distortion amplitude (referred to as
its AR probe or probe) required to change its classification outputs.
To address the second challenge, we apply a bootstrappingmethod
to remove the need for error-prone parameter tuning. In specific,
for the given input x , we generate a set of shadow inputs {xϵ }
via semi-random perturbations. By comparing the probes of x and
{xϵ } (differential analysis), we estimate the likelihood that x has
been maliciously tampered. If suspicious, we further infer x’s cor-
rect classification output by analyzing the consensus of {xϵ } (con-
sensus analysis).
The framework of EagleEye is illustrates in Figure 6. Below we
elaborate its key components, ARP in § 4.3.1, bootstrapping in § 4.3.2,
and probe analysis in § 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Adversarial Radius Probing. In this stage, by performing
random perturbations on the given input x , EagleEye estimates the
minimum distortion amplitude (i.e., probe) necessary to change its
classification by f . Intuitively, x’s probe, denoted by ρ(x), reflects
its AR in an attack-neutral manner.
Yet, it is often infeasible to estimate ρ(x) by running random
perturbations on all of x’s components given its high dimensional-
ity. We use a semi-random perturbation method: (i) magnification
- EagleEye first dynamically identifies a set of saliency regions in x
that maximally impact its classification; (ii) diversification - it per-
forms random perturbations over such regions to estimate ρ(x).
We detail these two operations below.
Magnification. The magnification operation is loosely based on
attention mechanisms [1, 16], inspired by that human’s vision au-
tomatically focuses on certain regions of an image with “high res-
olution” while perceiving surrounding regions in “low resolution”.
We use a simple attention mechanism with computational advan-
tages.
For the given input x , we define a set of d × d spatial regions
(d = 4 in our implementation). We generate all possible regions of
x by applying an identity kernel of size d × d over x , similar to a
convolution operation.
To select the top n saliency regions that maximally impact x’s
classification, we apply a greedy approach. We sort the compo-
nents of x according to their saliency (e.g., its gradient or Jacobian
value) in descending order. Let rank(x) be the ranking of the com-
ponent x . The saliency of a region π is the aggregated saliency
contributed by all the components contained in π :
saliency(π ) =
∑
x ∈π
c−rank(x)
where c (c ≥ 1) is a constant.
This definition allows us to control the characteristics of se-
lected regions. With large c , we focus on regions that cover the
most influential components; while with small c (i.e., close to 1),
we find regions that contain less influential components. The ratio-
nale behind balancing these two factors is as follows: the saliency
landscape shifts as x is perturbed as xϵ ; yet, due to the inherent
continuity of DNNs, the variation tends to be local. By properly
setting c , we are able to accommodate such shift and still capture
the most influential component in xϵ .
We iteratively select the top n regions. Let Ri be the selected
regions after the ith iteration. We then update the saliency of each
remaining region by removing the contributions by components
contained in regions in Ri . Formally,
saliency(π ) =
∑
x ∈π ⋂π ′∈Ri ,x ∈π ′
c−rank(x)
We then pick the region with the largest saliency among the
remaining ones. We will discuss the optimal setting of k and c in
§ 6.
Diversification. At this step, given the saliency regions R of x ,
we perform random perturbations on R to estimate x’s probe ρ(x).
With a little abuse of notations, let π be the set of components
contained in the regions of R . At each run, following a predefined
distribution p (with parameter θ), we randomly select a subset of
components in π to construct the perturbation vector r , denoted
by r {θ π . A successful perturbation r results in f (x + r ) , o,
where o is x’s current classification output by f .
In our current implementation, we instantiate θ as a uniform
distribution and assume the flipping perturbation which sets an
input component to either fully-on (‘1’) or fully-off (‘-1’). The dis-
tortion amplitude is therefore measurable by the sampling rate θ
ofp. While other instantiations are certainly possible (e.g., zipf dis-
tribution), we find that this instantiation is both (i) effective in dis-
criminating adversarial inputs (§ 6) and (ii) simple to control by
the system operator. Moreover, the large entropy of uniform dis-
tributions enhances the hardness for the adversary to evade the
detection (§ 5 and § 6).
In the following, we consider the minimum sampling rate θ∗
required to cause successful perturbations as x’s probe, which in-
directly reflects x’s AR.
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4.3.2 Bootstrap Operation. By randomly perturbing the given
input x , the bootstrap operation produces a set of adversarial in-
puts {xϵ }, which we refer to as x’s shadow inputs. Intuitively, such
shadow inputs represent x’s near (if not the nearest) adversarial
counterparts in other classes.
Specifically, to generate {xϵ }, we adopt the same semi-random
perturbation strategy as in § 4.3.1, except for that the sampling rate
is now fixed to be x’s probe θ∗ . This practice ensures that the gen-
erated shadow inputs are as close to x as possible. Further, as will
be revealed in § 4.3.3, in consensus analysis, this practice also helps
uncover the correct classification of x if it is adversarial. To provide
stable estimation, we require the number of shadow inputs to be
larger than a threshold k (k ≥ 4 seems sufficient in practice § 6).
We then estimate the probes of all the shadow inputs, {ρ(xϵ )},
which, together with ρ(x), are fed as inputs to the phase of probe
analysis. For simplicity of presentation, in the following, let ρ and
ρϵ denote the probes of x and xϵ ∈ {xϵ } respectively.
4.3.3 Probe Analysis. In this phase, by analyzing the probes of
the given input x and its shadow inputs {xϵ }, EagleEye determines
the likelihood that x has been maliciously tampered (differential
analysis); if so, it further attempts to recover its correct classifica-
tion result (consensus analysis).
Differential Analysis. Recall that {xϵ } represent x’s near (if not
the nearest) adversarial neighbors in other classes. Thus, if x itself
is adversarial, x and xϵ can be considered as adversarial versions
of each other, thereby featuring similar ARs; otherwise, if x is a
genuine input, the ARs of x and {xϵ } tend to show significant dif-
ference (see Figure 5).
In differential analysis, we leverage this insight and examine the
probes of x and each shadow input xϵ . Intuitively, a larger probe
ratio of ρ/ρϵ indicates that x is more likely to be genuine. Con-
cretely, with a given shadow input xϵ , we estimates the likelihood
that xϵ is genuine as:
genuinexϵ (x) =
1
1 + exp(1 − ρ/ρϵ )
Here the sigmoid function converts ρ/ρϵ to the interval of (0, 1),
which we may roughly interpret as the “probability” that x is gen-
uine. In specific, this probability is 0.5 if ρ/ρϵ = 1. The overall
likelihood that x is genuine is computed by aggregating the results
over all the shadow inputs: genuine(x) = ∑xϵ genuinexϵ (x)/|{xϵ }|.
In our empirical evaluation in § 6, we find a threshold 0.625
works well across all the known attacks.
Consensus Analysis. As shown in Figure 6, if x passes the differ-
ential analysis, it is reported as “genuine”; otherwise, it is consid-
ered as a “suspicious” case and moved to the phase of consensus
analysis, in which we attempt to infer its correct classification out-
put.
To be specific, recall that an adversarial input x (in class oϵ ) cre-
ated from a genuine input (in class o) resides near to the boundary
of o and oϵ . Thus, among its close adversarial neighbors in other
classes, a majority of them should belong to class o. By leveraging
this observation, we simply pick themost common class associated
with the shadow inputs {xϵ } as x’s most likely correct classifica-
tion output.
5 ANALYSIS OF EAGLEEYE
In the preceding sections, we present EagleEye that applies ad-
versarial radius analysis (ARA) to distinguish genuine and tam-
pered inputs. Next, we analytically explore the effectiveness of
ARA. Note that we do not intend to provide a definitive argument
about using EagleEye (or ARA) to mitigate adversarial input at-
tacks, but rather we view it as an initial step towards building uni-
versal, attack-agnostic defenses against adversarial inputs for DL
and machine learning systems in general. In specific, our analysis
attempts to draw the connection between ARA, DNN generaliz-
ability, and learning theory.
Furthermore, we discuss the adversary’s possible countermea-
sures to evade EagleEye’s detection. Recall that EagleEye is built on
the premise that the attacks follow theminimality principle: the ad-
versary attempts tominimize the distortion amplitude tomaximize
the attack’s evasiveness. We explore attack variants that (partially)
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abandon this principle. This amounts to investigating the adver-
sary’s design spectrum: the tradeoff between the evasiveness with
respect to EagleEye and the distortion amplitude (i.e., the evasive-
ness with respect to other detection mechanisms), which provides
insights for the best practice of EagleEye.
5.1 Effectiveness of Radius Analysis
The fundamental premise of ARA is that genuine inputs are in-
clined to have larger adversarial radii than their adversarial coun-
terparts. Below we provide the theoretical underpinnings of this
property. For simplicity of exposition, we exemplify l1-norm as the
measure of distortion amplitude, while our discussion generalizes
to other metrics as well.
From the view of an adversarial input xϵ , recall that attack A
produces xϵ by carefully perturbing a Ã§genuine input x . Regard-
less of its concrete implementation, A is essentially designed to
solve the optimization problem:
min
xϵ
| |xϵ − x | | s.t. f (xϵ ) = oϵ
where | |xϵ − x | | reflects the perturbation amplitude. Assume that
A operates on x with a sequence of t perturbations and r (i ) rep-
resent the perturbation vector at the end of the ith iteration (i =
1, 2, . . . , t ), with xϵ = x+r (t ). Theminimality principle implies that
A achieves the desired misclassification only after the t th iteration,
i.e.,
f (x + r (t−1)) = o
f (x + r (t )) = oϵ
Therefore, (x+r (t−1)) and (x+r (t )) represent two inputs lying be-
tween the class boundary ofo and oϵ . It is also noted that r (t−1) and
r (t ) differ only by a few components, depending on the concrete
implementation of A. For example, the attacks in [8, 33] perturb
two input components at each round, and r (t−1) and r (t−1) differ
by two components. We thus conclude that xϵ resides extremely
close to the class boundary of o and oϵ .
Next, we move on to explain the effectiveness of ARA from the
perspective of a genuine input x . Our intuition is that if x is classi-
fied as class o by DNN f with high confidence, its radii to the class
boundaries induced by f must be reasonably large. To make this
intuition more precise, we resort to statistical learning theory on
the connection of classification confidence and ARA.
Definition 5.1 (Confidence). The classification confidence of an
input-output pair (x, o) (i.e., f classifies x as o) is measured by the
difference of the largest and second largest probabilities in f (x)
(e.g., the softmax output). Formally, ϕ(x) = minoϵ,o
√
2(δo −δoϵ ) ·
f (x), where δi is the Kronecker delta vector with the ith element
being 1 and 0 otherwise and · denotes inner product.
We now introduce an interesting result that connects the con-
cept of classification confidence with ARA (adapted from [40] , pp.
14):
Theorem. Given aDNN f and a genuine inputx , withW (l ) being
the weight matrix of the l th layer of f , we have the following bound
for the AR of x :
ρ(x) ≥ ϕ(x)∏
W (l ) | |W (l ) | |F
where | | · | |F represents Frobenius norm.
Intuitively, if a DNN f makes confident classification of x , x
tends to have a large AR. Astute readers may point to the possibil-
ity of using confidence instead of ARA to adversarial inputs. How-
ever, note that high confidence is only one sufficient condition for
large ARs; as observed in our empirical evaluation in § 6 and previ-
ous work [14], there are adversarial inputs with high classification
confidence but show small ARs.
Another implication of the above theorem is that increasing the
classification confidence of DNNs is beneficial for discriminating
adversarial inputs. Along this direction, defensive distillation [34]
is designed exactly for this purpose: by increasing the temperature
τ , it amplifies the probability difference in the outputs of DNNs.
In § 6, we empirically show the synergistic effects of integrating
defensive distillation and EagleEye.
5.2 Adversary’s Dilemma
We now explore possible attack variants that attempt to evade Ea-
gleEye’s detection or ARA in specific. Since EagleEye is built on
top of the minimality principle underlying varied attack models,
one possible way to evade its detection is to (partially) abandon
this principle in preforming adversarial perturbations.
Specifically, following § 5.1, let r (i ) be the perturbation vector at
the end of the ith iteration and assume the adversary achieves the
desired misclassification right after the t th iteration: f (x + r (t )) =
oϵ . Now, instead of stopping here, the adversary keeps on perturb-
ing x , attempting to increase its AR ρ(xϵ ). Even in the ideal case,
the adversary needs to perturb at least ρ(x) input components, re-
sulting in an approximate perturbation amplitude of 2 · ρ(x). Intu-
itively, if x is selected at random, then the quantity of 2 · ρ(x) rep-
resents the distance of two genuine inputs, while in real datasets,
the difference of distinct inputs is fairly discernible even to human
eyes. Furthermore, due to the high nonlinearity of DNNs, the extra
perturbation amplitude is often much larger this lower bound. The
empirical validation of this hypothesis is given in § 6.3, in which
we also consider the adversary’s another countermeasure of ran-
dom perturbations.
This analysis above reveals a difficult dilemma for the adversary:
she desires to preserve the AR of an adversarial input to evade
EagleEye’s detection; yet, to do so, she is forced to introduce extra
perturbations sufficient to transform one genuine input to another,
thereby significantly reducing the attack’s evasiveness regarding
other detection mechanisms (e.g., human vision).
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the efficacy of EagleEye.
Specifically, our experiments are designed to answer the following
key questions.
• Q:Does EagleEye effectively distinguishadversarial and gen-
uine inputs in an attack-agnostic manner?
A: (§ 6.2) EagleEye achieves very high detection accu-
racy across benchmark datasets and attack models. For in-
stance, its average recall and precision are 99.5% and 97.0%
on the Mnist dataset. In particular, this performance is
achieved under the same parameter setting without any
tuning to datasets or attack models.
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• Q: Does EagleEye cause new attack-defense arm races?
A: (§ 6.3) To evade EagleEye’s detection, the adversary
has to abandon the minimality principle by significantly
increasing the distortion amplitude, which weakens the at-
tack’s evasiveness with respect to other detection mecha-
nisms and has fairly low success rate (less than 40% across
benchmark datasets).
• Q: Does EagleEye complement other defense solutions?
A: (§ 6.4) EagleEye exerts minimal interference to ex-
isting system components, and is compatible with any de-
fense mechanisms. Further, defense-enhanced DNNs, with
stronger generalization capabilities, provide even better
foundations for EagleEye to operate, leading to above 4%
increase in both precision and recall.
6.1 Experimental Settings
Weuse the same set of original DNNmodels and benchmark datasets
as in the empirical study in § 3. The details of DNN models and
datasets are referred to Appendix A and B. We also evaluate Eagle-
Eye against the set of representative attacks in § 2.2. The default
setting of parameters is as follows: # patches n = 8, ranking coeffi-
cient c = 1.25, and # shadow inputs k = 4.
6.2 Discriminant Power of EagleEye
In this set of experiments, we show that EagleEye is capable of
performing accurate detection of adversarial inputs in an attack-
agnostic manner. We prepare the testing set as follows. We first
randomly sample 5,000 inputs from each dataset, which form the
pool of genuine inputs. We then apply all the attacks to each gen-
uine input to generate its adversarial versions (with the adversarial
target class randomly selected and the perturbation amplitude lim-
ited as 112 for P- and C-Attack and 0.25 for G- and H-Attack
as in [14, 34]); those successfully crafted instances form the pool
of adversarial inputs. Due to the high success rates of adversarial
attacks (see Table 2), the genuine and adversarial pools are quite
balanced.
We apply EagleEye to detect adversarial inputs and use the fol-
lowing metrics to measure its performance:
Recall =
tp
tp + f n
Precision =
tp
tp + f p
where tp, f p, and f n represent the number of true positive, false
positive, and false negative cases (adversarial: +, genuine: -). Intu-
itively, recall and precision measure the sensitivity and specificity
of EagleEye.
Table 3 summarizes EagleEye’s performance against varied at-
tacks on the benchmark datasets. Observe that EagleEye provides
universal, attack-agnostic protection for DNNs: across all the cases,
EagleEye achieves high precision (above 87%) and recall (above
94%), indicating its strong discriminant power against adversar-
ial inputs. Note that in all these cases, EagleEye has slightly bet-
ter recall than precision. We hypothesize that those false positive
cases are genuine inputs with low classification confidence (see
§ 5), while in the simplest Mnist dataset, most inputs have fairly
high confidence scores, resulting in its lowest false positive rates.
Dataset Metric
Attack Model
G- H- P- C-
Mnist
Precision 95.0% 96.5% 98.4% 98.0%
Recall 99.2% 100.0% 99.2% 99.6%
Cifar10
Precision 88.8% 90.8% 89.9% 91.2%
Recall 98.4% 94.4% 96.4% 99.6%
Svhn
Precision 88.3% 88.6% 87.3 88.2%
Recall 99.2% 96.4% 99.2% 98.8%
Table 3: EagleEye detection accuracy with respect to differ-
ent benchmark datasets and attack models.
Datasets
Attack Models
G-Attack H-Attack P-Attack C-Attack
Mnist 62.2% 94.6% 61.2% 61.6%
Cifar10 70.0% 91.2% 42.8% 79.4%
Svhn 74.8% 91.6% 27.2% 47.6%
Table 4: Failure rates of adversarial inputs to reach desirable
ARs with respect to benchmark datasets and attacks.
We also examine EagleEye’s impact on genuine cases misclas-
sified by DNNs. For those cases, EagleEye detects them as gen-
uine inputs with accuracy of 96.4%, 94.4%, and 95.6% on theMnist,
Cifar10, and Svhn dataset respectively, implying that EagleEye’s
performance is relatively independent of the DNN’s accuracy.
We then evaluate EagleEye’s effectiveness in uncovering the
correct classification of adversarial inputs. Among the adversarial
cases detected by EagleEye, we calculate the recovery rate as the
proportion of inputs whose classes are correctly inferred. We find
EagleEye’s recovery is effective against both linear and nonlinear
attacks. For example, against H-Attack, it achieves 85.6% recovery
on theMnist dataset; against P-Attack, it achieves 66.0% recovery
on the Cifar10 dataset. Note that this performance is achieved un-
der the same parameter setting without any adjustment towards
datasets or attacks; thus, we believe EagleEye’s performance can
be further improved by fine parameter tuning. The experiments on
parameter tuning are referred to Appendix E.
To summarize, in an attack-agnostic manner, EagleEye effec-
tively discriminates maliciously tampered inputs and even uncov-
ers their original classification outputs. It can be seamlessly de-
ployed into any existing DL-powered systems. The analysis results
of EagleEye can be combined with the DNN classification results to
form comprehensive reports to enable more informative decision-
making for the system operators.
6.3 Adversary’s Countermeasures
Next we discuss adversary’s possible countermeasures to evade Ea-
gleEye’s detection and their implications. Remember that the fun-
damental cornerstone of EagleEye is the minimality principle un-
derlying varied adversarial input attacks. Therefore, to evade Ea-
gleEye’s detection, one natural option for the adversary is to aban-
don this principle. Rather than applying the minimum possible dis-
tortion, she attempts to find a suboptimal perturbation vector lead-
ing to larger ARs.
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Specifically, after the adversarial input xϵ achieves the misclas-
sification oϵ , the adversary continues the perturbation process, in
an attempt to increase xϵ ’s AR. Following the analysis in § 5, here
we empirically evaluate the implications of the adversary’s coun-
termeasure. Assume that for a given genuine input x , the adversary
desires to make xϵ with AR comparable with that of x .
We first investigate the cases that fail to achieve the desired AR
under the given perturbation amplitude, which is increased to 448
for P- and C-Attack, and 1 for G- and H-Attack. Table 4 lists
the failure rates of adversarial inputs on each dataset. For exam-
ple, even by quadrupling the distortion amplitude, over 40% of the
inputs cannot achieve ARs comparable with their genuine coun-
terparts on Cifar10. This is explained by that due to the highly
nonlinear, nonconvex nature of DNNs, the AR of an adversarial
input is a nonlinear function of the distortion amplitude as well.
Thus, solely increasing the amplitude does not necessarily lead to
the desired AR.
Moreover, we examine those cases that indeed reach the desired
ARs. Let xϵ and x ′ϵ represent the adversarial input generated with
and without theminimality principle.Wemeasure the ratio of their
distortion amplitudes. Figure 7 plots the distribution of such ratios
on the Svhn dataset (experiments on other datasets in Appendix
E). Note that regardless of the concrete attacks, for a majority of ad-
versarial inputs, in order to make them evasive against EagleEye’s
detection, the adversary has to amplify the distortion amplitude by
more than 2.5 times than that guided by the minimality principle.
Such large distortionwould be detectable by potential anomaly de-
tection systems or even human vision [33]. This empirical evidence
also validates our analysis in § 5.
Besides performing delicate perturbations to increase the ARs
of adversarial inputs, the adversary may also try random pertur-
bations in hope of finding adversarial inputs with satisfying ARs.
We simulate this countermeasure by generating adversarial inputs
with the minimum principle and then applying random perturba-
tion to them. Figure 8 shows the ratio of distortion amplitudes after
and before random perturbations (experiments on other datasets
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dom perturbation vs. minimality principle) on Svhn.
Cases
Dataset
Mnist Cifar10 Svhn
defended by DD 100.0% 98.4% 90.8%
uncaptured by DD 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 5: Accuracy of EagleEye against adversarial inputs de-
fended/uncaptured by defensive distillation (DD).
in Appendix E). Again, this countermeasure leads to significantly
increased distortion amplitudes.
To summarize, EagleEye creates a difficult dilemma for the ad-
versary: she has to balance the attack’s evasiveness against Eagle-
Eye and other potential detection systems. In many cases, this bal-
ance is difficult to find, due to the highly nonlinear, nonconvex
nature of DNNs.
6.4 EagleEye and Other Defenses
One advantage of EagleEye is that it exerts minimal interference
with existing system components. This feature makes it comple-
mentary with other defense mechanisms, while their integration
often leads to synergistic effects. In this set of experiments, we val-
idate this hypothesis by investigating the effects of applying Eagle-
Eye on top of defensive distillation (DD) [34]. As shown in Table 2,
while effective against G-, H-, and P-Attack, DD is vulnerable
to adaptively designed attacks (e.g., C-Attack). For example, C-
Attack achieves near-perfect success rates on benchmark datasets.
First we consider adversarial inputs that are successfully de-
fended byDD. In particular,we apply P-Attack over original DNNs
and collect all the adversarial inputs which pass original DNNs but
are defended by DD. For each adversarial input xϵ in this category,
DD recognizes its correct class but is unaware that xϵ is adversarial.
The first row of Table 5 lists EagleEye’s accuracy of detecting such
cases as adversarial. It is clear that for cases successfully defended
by DD, EagleEye can provide additional diagnosis information for
the system operator.
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Second we consider adversarial inputs that penetrate the pro-
tection of DD. In particular, we apply C-Attack over defensive
distilled DNNs and collect all the successfully generated adversar-
ial inputs. Table 5 lists EagleEye’s accuracy of detecting such cases
as adversarial. EagleEye achieves perfect detection rate in this cat-
egory. It is clear for cases that penetrate the protection of DD, Ea-
gleEye provides another safe net.
We are not arguing to replace exiting defenses with EagleEye.
Rather, we believe it is beneficial to integrate complementary de-
fense mechanisms, which significantly sharpens the edge of vul-
nerability to adaptive attacks.
7 DISCUSSION
The preceding analytical and empirical analysis shows that Eagle-
Eye, adversarial radius analysis (ARA) in specific, effectively dis-
criminates adversarial inputs and even reveals their correct classi-
fication outputs.
One limitation of EagleEye is that its effectiveness, to some ex-
tent, depends on the generalization capabilities of DNNs, although
practically useful DNNs need to have sufficient generalizability
(DNN generalizability and robustness are two related but distinct
properties [12]). We thus argue that the research on improving
DNN generalizability and that on defense mechanisms against ad-
versarial inputs complement each other. It is our ongoing research
to improve the effectiveness of EagleEye against ambiguous inputs
and weak DNN.
Wemeasure the distortion amplitude using l1- or l∞-norm. There
are other metrics for measuring input distance. For example, craft-
ing adversarial malware samples to evade malware detection may
require adopting other metrics [13, 17].We plan to investigate how
to extend our solution to other metrics and perturbations. Yet, we
believe the minimality principle still holds. For example, the mal-
ware author still wishes to preserve malware’s functional behav-
iors.
In § 6, we empirically show the synergistic effects of combining
defensive distillation and EagleEye. It is expected because defense-
enhanced DNNs, with stronger generalization capabilities than orig-
inal models, provide better foundations for ARA to operate. Thus,
we consider the integration of other defense mechanisms (e.g., data
augmentation and robust optimization) and EagleEye as a promis-
ing future direction to explore.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that EagleEye does not create
new attack vectors. It can be deployed compatibly with existing
defense solutions. Its premise, the minimality principle, is an un-
derlying principle followed by many attack models [8, 14, 21, 33].
Even if the adversary knows that EagleEye is deployed, the only
way to evade its detection is to amplify the adversarial distortion
amplitude, which however reduces the attack’s evasiveness with
respect to other defense mechanisms. Therefore, EagleEye indeed
creates a difficult dilemma for the adversary.
8 ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
Next we review three categories of related work: adversarial ma-
chine learning, deep learning-specific attacks and defenses, and ro-
bustness of deep neural networks.
Lying at the core of many security-critical domains, machine
learning systems are increasingly becoming the targets of mali-
cious attacks [3, 4, 20]. Two primary threat models are consid-
ered in literature: (i) poisoning attacks, in which the attackers pol-
lute the training data to eventually compromise the learning sys-
tems [7, 35, 45], and (ii) evasion attacks, in which the attackers
modify the input data at test time to trigger the learning systems
tomisbehave [10, 27, 29]. Yet, for ease of analysis, most of the work
assumes simple learning models (e.g., linear classifier, support vec-
tor machine, logistic regression) deployed in adversarial settings.
Addressing the vulnerabilities of deep learning systems to ad-
versarial inputs is more challenging for they are designed to model
highly nonlinear, nonconvex functions [31, 36]. One line of work
focuses on developing new attacks against DNNs [8, 14, 21, 33, 43],
most of which attempt to find the minimum possible modifications
to the input data to trigger the systems to misclassify. The detailed
discussion of representative attack models is given in § 2.2. An-
other line of work attempts to improve DNNs resilience against
such adversarial attacks [14, 18, 21, 34]. However, these defense
mechanisms often require significant modifications to either DNN
architectures or training processes, which may negatively impact
the classification accuracy of DNNs. Moreover, as shown in § 3, the
defense-enhanced models, once deployed, can often be fooled by
adaptively engineered inputs or by new attack variants. To our best
knowledge, this work represents an initial step to attack-agnostic
defenses against adversarial attacks.
Finally, another active line of research explores the theoretical
underpinnings of DNN robustness. For example, Fawzi et al. [11]
explore the inherent trade-off between DNN capacity and robust-
ness; Feng et al. [12] seek to explain why neural nets may gener-
alize well despite poor robustness properties; and Tanay and Grif-
fin [44] offer a theoretical explanation for the abundance of adver-
sarial inputs in the input manifold space.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new approach to defend deep learn-
ing (DL) systems against adversarial input attacks. Our work was
motivated by the observations that the fundamental challenges to
tackle adversarial inputs stem from their adaptive and variable na-
ture, while static defenses can often be circumvented by adaptively
engineered inputs or by new attack variants. We developed a prin-
cipled approach that, by leveraging the underlying design prin-
ciples shared by varied attacks, discriminates adversarial inputs
in a universal, attack-agnostic manner. We designed and imple-
mented EagleEye, a prototype defense engine which can be readily
deployed into any DL systems, requiring no modification to exist-
ing components. Through comprehensive adversarial tampering
analysis, EagleEye enables more informative decision-making for
the operators of deep learning systems. Our empirical evaluations
showed that EagleEye, when applied to three benchmark datasets,
detected nearly 96% adversarial inputs generated by a range of at-
tacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Datasets
TheMnist dataset [25] constitutes a set of 28×28 greyscale images
of handwritten digits (‘0’-‘9’), with 60K training and 10K testing
samples.
The Cifar10 dataset [22] consists of 32×32 color images from
ten classes (e.g., ‘airplane’, ‘automobile’, ‘bird’), split into 50K train-
ing and 10K testing samples.
The Svhn dataset [30] comprises color images of house num-
bers collected by Google Street View. We consider the format of
32×32 pixel images. The task is to classify the digit around the cen-
ter of each image. There are 73K and 26K digits in the training and
testing sets, respectively.
All the datasets are centered and normalized such that the value
of each pixel lies in the interval of [−1, 1].
B. Implementation of DNN Models
In the followingwe present the detailed architectures of DNNmod-
els used in our empirical evaluation.
Convolutional Neural Network. The DNNmodel applied to clas-
sifying theMnist dataset is a convolutional neural network (Cnn).
In particular, we adopt an architecture similar to [34], which is
summarized in Table 6. In addition, we apply dropout (rate = 0.5)
at both fully connected layers.
Maxout Network. The maxout network (Mxn) model general-
izes conventional Cnn models by employing maxout activation
functions, which pool over multiple affine feature maps in addi-
tion to pooling over adjacent spatial locations as in convolution
operations. Therefore, an maxout convolutional layer is defined as
the composition of one convolutional layer, one regular pooling
layer, and one maxout pooling layer.
To classify theCifar10 dataset, we adopt an architecture similar
to that in [15], which consists of threemaxout convolutional layers
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Layer Definition
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 32, kernel: 3×3
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 32, kernel: 3×3
Max Pooling pool: 2×2, stride: 1
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 64, kernel: 3×3
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 64, kernel: 3×3
Max Pooling pool: 2×2, stride: 1
ReLU Fully Connected # units: 256
ReLU Fully Connected # units: 256
Softmax # units: 10
Table 6: Convolutional network architecture (Mnist)
and one maxout fully connected layer, as detailed in Table 7. We
apply dropout (rate = 0.5) at each maxout convolutional layer.
Layer Definition
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 128 kernel: 5×5, padding: 4
Max Pooling pool: 3×3, stride: 2
Maxout # units: 64 (2 pieces/unit)
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 256 kernel: 5×5, padding: 3
Max Pooling pool: 3×3, stride: 2
Maxout # units: 128 (2 pieces/unit)
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 256 kernel: 5×5, padding: 3
Max Pooling pool: 3×3, stride: 2
Maxout # units: 128 (2 pieces/unit)
ReLU Fully Connected # units: 2,000
Maxout # units: 400 (5 pieces/unit)
Softmax # units: 10
Table 7: Maxout network architecture (Cifar10)
Network-in-Network. To classify the Svhn dataset, we apply an
network-in-network (Nin) model, which features another distinct
architecture. In conventional Cnn, the convolution filter is essen-
tially a generalized linear model (Glm) for the underlying data
patch. The Nin architecture replaces Glm with an “micro neural
network” structure which is a nonlinear function approximator to
enhance the abstraction capability of the local model.
Following [26], we use multilayer perceptron (Mlp) as the in-
stantiation of micro network. In the resulting mlpconv layer, the
Mlp is shared among all local receptive fields, while the feature
maps are obtained by sliding the Mlp over the input in a similar
manner as Cnn.
Specifically, ourNinmodel comprises three mlpconv layers, fol-
lowed by one average pooling layer and one softmax layer, as sum-
marized in Table 8. Dropout (rate = 0.5) is applied at each mlpconv
layer.
C. Implementation of Defense Methods
We implement one representative defense mechanism from each
category of defense strategies in § 2.3.
Data Augmentation. Recall that with data augmentation, adver-
sarial inputs are incorporated in training a more robust DNN f ′.
Our implementation of this defense mechanism proceeds as fol-
lows.
Layer Definition
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 96, kernel: 5×5, padding: 2
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 96, kernel: 1×1
Max Pooling pool: 3×3, stride: 2
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 192, kernel: 5×5, padding: 2
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 192, kernel: 1×1
Max Pooling pool: 3×3, stride: 2
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 192, kernel: 3×3, padding: 1
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 192, kernel: 1×1
ReLU Convolutional # filters: 10, kernel: 1×1
Average Pooling pool: 8×8
Softmax # units: 10
Table 8: Network-in-network architecture (Svhn)
• We begin with an initialized DNN f and an attack of interest
A;
• At each iteration, regarding the current f , we apply A to a
minibatch {(x, o)} randomly sampled from the training set, and
generate an augmented minibatch {(x,xϵ ,o)}; We update f us-
ing the objective function:
min
f
∑
(x,xϵ ,o)
(ℓ(f (x), o) + ℓ(f (xϵ ), o))
We instantiate the attack A as each of G-, H-, P-, C-Attack and
refer to the resulting models as G-, H-, P-, and C-trained DNN
respectively.
Robust Optimization. Recall that with robust optimization, one
improves DNN stability by preparing it for the worst-case inputs,
which is often formulated as an minimax optimization framework.
We implement the framework in [38], wherein the loss function
is minimized over adversarial inputs generated at each parameter
update. To be specific, it instantiates Eqn. (1) with finding the per-
turbation vector r (with respect to an input instance (x, o)) that
maximizes its inner product with the gradient of objective func-
tion:
r = argmax
r
〈▽ℓ(f (x), o)), r 〉 (2)
For l∞-norm, we limit | |r | |∞ ≤ 0.2; for l1-norm, we limit | |r | |1 ≤
2 ∗ 2 (no more than 2 pixels).
Model Transfer. Recall that with model transfer, the knowledge
in a teacher DNN f (trained on legitimate inputs) is extracted and
transferred to a student DNN f ′, such that f ′ generalizes better
to adversarial inputs. Specifically, we implement the defensive dis-
tillation mechanism in [34] as a representative method of model
transfer. We set the temperature τ = 40 in the experiments as sug-
gested by [34].
D: Training of DNN Models
The training process identifies the optimal setting for a DNN’s pa-
rameters w . Due to complex structures of DNN models and mas-
sive amount of training data, we apply Stochastic Gradient De-
scent withNesterovmomentum [41] as the optimization algorithm.
More specifically, let ℓ(w) represent the objective function (e.g., the
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Figure 9: Distribution of ratio of distortion amplitudes (with-
out vs. with minimality principle) on Cifar10.
cross entropy of ground-truth class labels and DNN models’ out-
puts). At each epoch, the gradient of ℓ with respect to w is com-
puted over a “mini-batch” (e.g., each of 128 samples) sampled from
the training data via a back-propagation procedure. The update
rule ofw is given by:{
v = µv − λ · ▽ℓ(w + µv)
w := w +v
where v represents the “velocity”, µ denotes the “momentum”, λ
is the learning rate, and ▽ is the gradient operator. The training
process repeats until the objective function converges.
In implementation, the default learning rates forMnist,Cifar10,
and Svhn datasets are respectively set as 0.1, 0.01, and 0.01; the de-
fault momentum µ is fixed as 0.9; the optimization algorithm is
run for up to 240 epochs. In addition, we apply an adaptive learn-
ing rate scheme: at each epoch, let ℓ and ℓ∗ respectively be the loss
of current epoch and the best loss thus far; the learning rate is ad-
justed as: λ = λ · exp( ℓ∗−ℓs ), where s = 2.5 if ℓ∗ ≥ ℓ and s = 0.75 if
ℓ∗ < ℓ. The DNN models are trained using the training set of each
dataset. All the algorithms are implemented on top of Theano4, a
Python-based DL library. All the experiments are performed using
an array of 4 Nvidia GTX 1080 GPUs.
E: Additional Experiments
Here we list the experiment results in addition to those in § 6, in-
cluding the impact of parameter tuning on EagleEye’s performance,
and the tradeoff between the attack’s evasiveness regarding Eagle-
Eye and other defenses.
4Theano: http://deeplearning.net/software/theano/
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Figure 13: Impact of number of patches c on EagleEye’s per-
formance.
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formance.
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